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COUNTY COURT OF NEW YORK
People v. Lacey'
(decided May 6, 2004)
Richard Lacey was arrested on September 16, 2002 and
charged with multiple counts of burglary, criminal possession of a
weapon, and criminal possession of stolen property.2 He moved to
suppress various evidentiary items claiming that "all of the
evidence upon which probable cause [had been] based was
illegally obtained by the . . . use of a [Global Positioning System]
device" that was attached to the undercarriage of his girlfriend's
car without a search warrant.' He contended that the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 12 of the New York Constitution protected his right to be
free from warrantless searches and seizures, and that such conduct
violated those rights.' Specifically, he argued that the protections
of the United States and New York Constitutions extended to the
attachment of a global positioning device; that such an attachment
constituted a search under both constitutions.'
' No. 2463N/02, 2004 WL 1040676, at *1 (N.Y. County Ct. May 6, 2004).2id.
3Id. at *4.
4 Id. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV, which provides in pertinent part: "The right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, .. . but upon probable
cause . .."; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12, which provides in pertinent part: "The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, ... but upon probable
cause...."
5 Lacey, 2004 WL 1040676, at *4.
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On the issue of whether the attachment of a Global
Positioning System (GPS)6 to the undercarriage of a vehicle,
without first securing a search warrant or obtaining consent,
violates a defendant's right against unreasonable searches and
seizures, the court held that, absent exigent circumstances, such
conduct violated a defendant's constitutional protections.7  It
recognized "that persons have diminished expectations of privacy
in automobiles on public roads," but remained unwilling to permit
the expanding use and availability of technology to "abrogate our
constitutional protections."'
During its investigation of multiple burglaries, Nassau
County Police, acting upon an identification made by one of the
victims, located a car that was allegedly driven by the perpetrator
of one of the crimes.9 The officers decided to conduct surveillance
of the vehicle and attached a self contained GPS device to the
undercarriage of the vehicle.'" The police conducted visual
surveillance for three days, and observed another vehicle parked at
6 "This particular system locates the vehicle by giving the latitude and
longitude of the GPS at any point in time, accomplishing through a
computer/satellite link incorporating a cellular modem and software compatible
with the tracking device." Id. at *1. See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12 (specifically
requiring a warrant for "interception of telephone and telegraph
communications"). This is pertinent to the discussion at bar because the GPS
used in tracking Lacey incorporated cellular technology.7 Lacey, 2004 WL 1040676, at *8.
8 Id. at *7-8.
9 Id. at * 1. During a burglary on July 8, 2002, a homeowner returned home
and saw two black males at her back door. Id. She chased them until they
entered a black Mitsubishi Eclipse bearing Tennessee license plate BER523. Id
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the premises where the suspect car was also located." The license
plates of the second vehicle were registered to a Richard Lacey of
Lawrence, Nassau County, New York. 12 A background check
revealed that he had prior arrests for burglary, and that he was
currently on parole. 3 A police officer contacted Lacey's parole
officer and spoke to him regarding the investigation.' During the
conversation, the officer described a unique photo that had been
stolen in one of the burglaries and the parole officer stated that he
had seen a similar photo in Lacey's living room. 5 "At that time
Lacey became the primary suspect in the investigation."' 6
Subsequently, the officers investigating the burglaries
detected, with the assistance of the GPS device, that the suspect car
had been moved to the vicinity of Lacey's address in Lawrence. 7
"A surveillance team was placed on the vehicle."'" The vehicle,
then being driven by Lacey, was followed both by visual means
and by monitoring the GPS coordinates. 9 The vehicle eventually
stopped at 3860 Arthur Avenue North in Seaford, Nassau County,
and when police arrived Lacey was observed walking away from
the residence toward the vehicle." The police monitored the
Id. at *2.
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vehicle through the GPS until it stopped several blocks away."
"At this time, [the officers] received a radio report that a burglary
had occurred at 3860 Arthur Avenue North .... "22 A description
of the perpetrator, which ultimately matched Lacey, was given to
the officers and he was apprehended as he walked down the
driveway of another residence several blocks away.23
As this was a case of first impression,24 the court discussed
persuasive authority from other jurisdictions, including decisions
from the federal circuits.25 The questions presented in those cases
hinged upon the determination of whether the installation of a GPS
device is so intrusive as to render it a search, regardless of the fact
that it has been held that individuals have no reasonable
expectation of privacy in their movements on public thoroughfares.
In State v. Jackson,26 the Washington Supreme Court found that the
"use of GPS tracking devices is a particularly intrusive method of
surveillance" and that citizens had "a right to be free from the type
of governmental intrusion that occurs when a GPS device is
attached to a citizen's vehicle regardless of reduced privacy
expectations." 7 However, the Washington Supreme Court was not
presented with a Fourth Amendment issue; there was no claim by
the defendant that his Fourth Amendment right had been violated.
The court was concerned only with the issue of whether the use of
21 id
22 Lacey, 2004 WL 1040676, at *2.
23 id.
24 Id. at * 1.
25 Id. at *4-7.
26 76 P.3d 217 (Wash. 2003).
226 [Vol 21
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a GPS device violated Washington's constitutional search
provisions. 8  Similarly, in State v. Campbell,9 the Oregon
Supreme Court held that, under its constitution, "the use of [a]
radio transmitter to locate ... [an] automobile was a search."3
Meanwhile, in United States v. Berry,3 although the court
did not need to decide the issue as the GPS was installed pursuant
to a warrant, the court noted a "GPS merely records electronically
what the police could learn if they were willing to devote the
personnel necessary to tail a car around the clock. The Supreme
Court might conclude, however, that the new technology is so
intrusive that the police must obtain a court order before using it."32
Therefore, the Berry court recognized the potential problems of
applying the existing "reasonable expectation test" to the
attachment of GPS devices, while speculating that the
intrusiveness of such conduct may bring it within the ambit of
Fourth Amendment search and seizure protections.
Therefore, the Lacey court held that the attachment of a
GPS device was a search within the meaning of both the Fourth
Amendment and Article I, Section 12 of the New York
Constitution.3 It stated that:
Although it is acknowledged that persons have
diminished expectations of privacy in automobiles
7 ld. at 224.281 Id. at 222, 222 n. 1.
29 759 P.2d 1040 (Or. 1988).
30 id. at 1049.
3' 300 F. Supp. 2d 366 (D.M.D. 2004).
32 Id. at 368,
33 Lacey, 2004 WL 1040676, at *7.
2005]
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on public roads and can be visually tracked by the
police, it is clear that the mere act of parking a
vehicle on a public street does not give law
enforcement the unfettered right to tamper with the
vehicle by surreptitiously attaching a tracking
device without either the owner's consent or
without a warrant issued by a Court.34
The decision clearly focused on the increasing necessity of
protecting citizens from unfettered intrusions.35 It stressed that
"[t]echnology cannot abrogate our constitutional protections. 36
Yet, in United States v. Moran," the Lacey decision was
criticized for failing to consider the Supreme Court's holding in
United States v. Knotts,38 namely, that " [a] person traveling in an
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation
of privacy in his movements from one place to another.'
Similar to Lacey, Moran sought the "suppression of any evidence
obtained from a GPS device attached to his vehicle as well as any
evidence derived from information obtained from the' GPS tracking
device, as violative of his Fourth Amendment rights."" Although
the pertinent facts of the two cases were basically identical,4' the
34 Id. at *8.
35 Id. at *7. "The citizens of New York have the right to be free in their
property, especially in light of technological advances which have and continue
to diminish this privacy." Id.
37 349 F. Supp. 2d 425 (N.D.N.Y. 2005).
38 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
39 Moran, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 467 (citing Knotts. 460 U.S. at 281).
40 Id
41 See id. at 433; Lacev. 2004 WL 1040676, at *1. Both defendants were
tracked with a GPS device that was attached to the undercarriage of their
vehicles, without a search warrant.
[Vol 2 1
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district court held that the attachment of a GPS device was not a
search and was therefore constitutional under the federal
constitution.42 The court, relying on Knotts, stated, "Moran had no
expectation of privacy in the whereabouts of his vehicle on a
public roadway"; therefore, there were "no Fourth Amendment
implications in the use of the GPS device. 43
The cases clearly turn on whether the court views the
attachment of a GPS device as a search in the constitutional
context. On the one hand, the Moran court found that such
conduct was not a search because of the lack of a reasonable
expectation of privacy in one's movements on public
thoroughfares." On the other hand, the court in Lacey found that
such conduct was a physical intrusion which constituted a search
regardless of the defendant's diminished expectation of privacy in
his automobile on public roads.45 Thus, the Moran court criticized
Lacey for failing to reconcile its reasoning with the Supreme
Court's decision in Knotts. It implied that the Lacey decision
overlooked the fact that there is no expectation of privacy while
traveling on public roads; consequently, the Fourth Amendment
could not be implicated by the mere tracking of a vehicle's
movement from one place to another.
In conclusion, courts analyzing the issue have
predominantly followed two lines of reasoning. On the one hand,
42 Moran, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 467.
43 id.
" Id
45 Lacey, 2004 WL 1040676, at *8.
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there are those courts that follow the existing "reasonable
expectation of privacy" test and hold that the attachment of a GPS
device is not a search under the Fourth Amendment and, therefore,
does not require a warrant. Such courts base their reasoning on the
defendants' lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
movements from one place to another regardless of the increased
level of intrusion due to advances in technology. On the other
hand, other courts have held that advances in technology should
not be permitted to abrogate the constitutional protections of the
Fourth Amendment or their respective state constitutional search
provisions. They reason that the intrusive nature of the attachment
of the devices and electronic tracking methods has increased and
is, therefore, properly within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment
protections, regardless of the diminished expectations of privacy.
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